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I. 
INTRODUCTION - SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Co-Appellant SE/Z Construction, LLC ("SE/Z") by and through its counsel of record 
hereby respectfully submits this Reply Brief on Appeal. The only issue before the Court on 
Appeal is whether the District Court erred as a matter of law in failing to apply Idaho Code 
§ 12-117 to Appellants' Application for an Award of Costs and Attorney's Fees. 
By its Response Brief, Respondent The State of Idaho, acting by and through its 
Department of Administration, a Division of Public Works ("DPW") reargues many ofthe 
issues which were before the District Court throughout the extended litigation. Including 
arguing facts presented to the District Court by way of DPW' s then expert witness Albert 
Munio. DPW's recent augmentation of the record included Mr. Munio's affidavit. DPW 
submitted Mr. Munio's affidavit testimony and opinions before the District Court and again 
before this Court in an attempt to establish that its positions both in the District Court and 
before this Court were/are grounded in a "reasonable basis in law or fact." However, 
Appellant SE/Z respectfully submits that DPW's reliance upon Mr. Munio both before the 
District Court and before this Court is completely misplaced. Mr. Munio was not a qualified 
or credible expert witness. 1 DPW's reliance upon Mr. Munio both below and on appeal 
1 Appellant SE/Z has moved to augment the record with respect to Mr. Munio, because DPW in its 
response augmented to include Mr. Munio's Affidavits on appeal. Mr. Munio's affidavit makes certain 
representations about his qualifications that were shown to be false. As such, this Court should have a full and 
1 
illustrates the lack of reasonable basis for DPW's position. Moreover, DPW's Response and 
arguments to this Court significantly fails to properly address the singular issue on appeal, 
which is the application ofIdaho Code § 12-117. 
Notwithstanding, DPW's lack of a reasonable basis in law or fact and reliance upon 
Mr. Munio, this case turns upon DPW's clear and unambiguous contract, and the District 
Court's ultimate determination that DPW's claims, counterclaims, cross-claims and claims 
for offset were barred? Because DPW's claims were barred, and therefore void ab initio, 
DPW's claims should have never been brought before the District Court. SE/Z respectfully 
submits that because DPW's claims were barred it cannot be argued it had a reasonable basis 
in law or fact in the litigation below. Moreover, the District Court's determinations 
regarding DPW's claims were conclusive and should not be revisited, particularly where 
DPW has not appealed from those determinations. 
complete record with respect to Mr. Munio's testimony, which was before the District Court. SE/Z directs the 
Court's attention to the exhibits attached to the Affidavit of Frederick J. Hahn, III, submitted with its Second Motion 
to Augment. When compared to his affidavit, the following sections demonstrate Mr. Munios lack of qualifications 
and credibility: Exhibit A (Munio Depo.), pp. 15-16,40-41; Exhibit C (BSU Transcript); Exhibit D (Interrogatory 
Responses from Employee of Pennsylvania Dept. ofEduc.); and Exhibit E (Depo of James Dean, President of 
Western Penn. Tech.), pp. 13-22. 
2 By its Memorandum Decision and Order of April 2, 2010 regarding DPW's Motion to Reconsider, the 
Court clarified "As the Court has ruled that the State's cross-claims and offsets are barred by the notice and 
opportunity to cure provision, the State will not be permitted to present evidence that other work performed by the 
Contractors, unrelated to the claims being brought by the Contractors, was non-conforming or allegedly defective 
and the State will not be permitted to present evidence of its costs to repair or replace allegedly defective work." ( 
R. Vol. IV, p.738) (Emphasis added). 
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II. 
ARGUMENT 
A. DPW Misconstrues Idaho Code § 12-117 and Tacitly Argues that the Old 
Statutory Language Requiring a Judgment Applies in Determining the 
Prevailing Party. 
In its Response Brief at pages 9-12, DPW argues that Appellants' are not entitled to 
attorney's fees under Idaho Code § 12-117, because the District Court did not render a 
judgment. Although by its footnote 3, DPW acknowledges recent and retroactive changes 
in Idaho Code § 12-117 apply, DPW nonetheless bases its argument on a prior version of the 
statute, which required the Court to enter a judgment or find in favor of a party, in order to 
qualify for an attorney's fee award. Clearly, Idaho Code § 12-117 does not require a 
judgment as a basis to award mandatory prevailing party attorneys fees. 
Recently in Smith v. Washington County, 150 Idaho 388, 247 P.3d 615 (2010) the 
Court noted recent changes in 12-117 by which the legislature removed the requirement that 
a judgment be rendered in order for the statute to apply. Most recently in Allied Bail Bonds, 
Inc. v. County o/Kootenai 151 Idaho 405,258 P.3d 340 (2011) the Court affirmed its prior 
holding in Straub v. Smith, 145 Idaho 65, 175 P.3d 754 (2007) in which the Court held 
attorneys fees may be properly awarded even when an action is voluntarily dismissed. In 
Allied, a bail bond surety first sued Kootenai County and entered into a settlement agreement 
County. Later, a second dispute arose between the parties in which Allied asserted the 
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County had not abided by the settlement agreement and a second action was filed. The 
district court ultimately dismissed the second Allied action pursuant to the County's IRCP 
12(b)( 6) motion. The District Court awarded the County attorney's fees based upon a 
provision in the settlement agreement. On appeal, this Court noted: 
"Allied asserts that a case must be decided on the merits in order for 
there to be a prevailing party entitled to attorney fees. This is a question oflaw 
over which this Court exercises free review. Contreras v. Rubley, 142 Idaho 
573,576, 130 P.3d 1111, 1114 (2006). The authority cited by Allied does not 
support its contention. To the contrary, this Court held in Straub v. Smith, 145 
Idaho 65,69, 175 P.3d 754, 758 (2007), that attorney fees may be appropriate 
where the parties have voluntarily stipulated to dismissal-one instance where 
a case is not decided on the merits. Attorney fee awards may also be 
appropriate where a case is dismissed on LR.C.P. 12(b) grounds. E.g., Nampa 
Charter School, Inc. v. DeLaPaz, 140 Idaho 23,29-30,89 P.3d 863, 869-70 
(2004); Lasser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 676, 183 P.3d 758, 764 (2008). 
The lack of a decision on the merits does not provide grounds to vacate the 
district court's award of attorney fees to the respondents." 
See, Allied, 151 Idaho at 414,258 P.3d at 349. 
DPW's assertions that an award of Idaho Code section 12-117 is appropriate only 
where the district court renders a judgment are mis-statements of Idaho law and are not 
supported by the plain language of Idaho Code section 12-117. While earlier, non-
applicable versions of the statute may support DPW's arguments, the present statute does 
not. 
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Moreover, DPW seems to ignore the reality that the District Court completely barred 
all of DPW's claims and ordered that it could not present any evidence of its cross or 
counterclaims. DPW's attempt to divorce itself from the District Court's disposition of 
DPW's counter claims and cross claims, focusing only upon the settlement amount paid, is 
similar to the error made by the trial court in Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating 
& Paving, inc. 141 Idaho 716, 117P.3d 130(2005). In Nord, the plaintiff owner brought an 
action against its contractor Nord and individual owners of Nord. The defendant Nord 
counterclaimed for approximately $12,000.00. At trial, the individual defendants were 
dismissed, one by stipulation and the other pursuant to a directed verdict motion. The jury 
determined that the defendant Nord was not liable to the plaintiff and awarded Nord 
$1,054.38 on the counterclaim. However, the trial court denied an award of cost and 
attorneys fees to Nord, finding no overall prevailing party. In reversing, the Supreme Court 
noted the trial court's error in overlooking the effect of defeating the plaintiff's claims. The 
Court stated: 
In determining which party prevailed in an action where there are claims and 
counterclaims between opposing parties, the court determines who prevailed 
"in the action." That is, the prevailing party question is examined and 
determined from an overall view, not a claim-by-claim analysis. 
Viewing its success from an overall standpoint, Nord Excavating was 
a prevailing party. In ruling it was not, the district court focused too much 
attention on the Company's less than tremendous success on its counterclaim 
5 
and seemingly ignored the fact that the Company avoided all liability as a 
defendant. The district court improperly undervalued the Company's successful 
defense. Avoiding liability is a significant benefit to a defendant. In baseball, 
it is said that a walk is as good as a hit. The latter, of course, is more exciting. 
In litigation, avoiding liability is as good for a defendant as winning a money 
judgment is for a plaintiff. The point is, while a plaintiff with a large money 
judgment may be more exalted than a defendant who simply walks out of court 
no worse for the wear, courts must not ignore the value of a successful 
defense. In this case, logic suggests that a verdict in Nord Excavating's favor 
and a victory on its counterclaim (albeit, a relatively small one), by definition, 
makes it a prevailing party. 
The individual Nords were also prevailing parties. Darrin left the suit 
upon a motion for directed verdict. He incurred no liability. For him that was 
"the most favorable outcome that could possibly be achieved." Daisy MIg. Co., 
Inc. v. Pain tball Sports, 134 Idaho 259, 262,999 P.2d 914,919 (Ct.App.2000). 
Also, Reed defended himself through the entire trial and escaped all 
liability-again, achieving the most favorable outcome that could possibly be 
achieved. The same must be said for Casey, who was dismissed a few days 
before trial. Darrin, Reed, and Casey are clearly prevailing parties. 
Nord Excavating, 141 Idaho at 719-720. 
DPW's attempt to focus only upon DPW's payment to SE/Z of$225,000, juxtaposed 
to the combined Contractors' Request for Equitable Adjustment3 of $1,973,107.38, is 
tantamount to the trial court's error in Nord. The Contractors prevailed "in the action." 
Based upon the Contractors' complete success in defeating DPW's claims, which was "the 
most favorable outcome that could possibly be achieved," coupled with a significant payment 
3 The break down of the Contractors' initial Request for Equitable Adjustment is found in the Record at R. 
Vol. V, pp 979-97. Attached as Appendix 1 to this brief is the summary break-out of the individual components of 
the Request for Equitable Adjustment. 
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from DPW, SE/Z respectfully submits SE/Z and Hobson were clearly prevailing parties under 
Idaho Code § 12-117 or any other bench-mark. 
B. DPW Ignores the Unchallenged Conclusion of the District Court That DPW 
Failed to Provide the Contractors with Notice and Any Opportunity to Repair 
Prior to Asserting It's Claims Against the Contractors, as Was Required by the 
Contract. 
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-117, the court "shall award the prevailing party 
reasonable attorney fees and other reasonable expenses, if it finds that the nonprevailing 
party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law." I.C. § 12-120(1). Section 12-117(2) 
applies the same requirement and an mandatory award of fees to a partially prevailing party. 
This Court has on multiple occasions awarded fees and costs to a prevailing party pursuant 
to section 12-117 when the nonprevailing party acted or pursued an incorrect interpretation 
contrary to the clear and unambiguous requirements of a statute or ordinance. In re Elliott, 
141 Idaho 177, 184, 108 P.3d 324,331 (2005); Fischer v. City a/Ketchum, 141 Idaho 349, 
356, 109 P.3d 1091, 1098 (2005). SE/Z respectfully requests the Court to apply the same 
reasoning to the terms of a clear and unambiguous contract, as the Court has done pursuant 
to a similar fees statute, Idaho Code § 12-121. Navarrette v. City a/Caldwell, 130 Idaho 
849,949 P.3d 547 (Ct. App. 1997); Laightv. First Nat'l Bank, 108 Idaho 211, 215, 697 P.2d 
1225, 1229 (Ct. App. 1985). 
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DPW cannot escape from the fact that the District Court dismissed its counter-cross 
claims and its alleged offsets against the Contractors' claims because they were wholly 
barred by DPW's failure to comply with the contractual prerequisites of its own contract 
before bringing a claim against the Contractors for damages. The District Court concluded 
that DPW failed to provide written notice and an opportunity to repair the alleged 
construction defects, as required by section 2.4.1 of the Contract. (R. Vol. IV, pp. 625-27 
and 741 L. 11-15.) The District Court repeatedly held the contractual provisions to be clear 
and unambiguous,4 and DPW does not argue on appeal that the Contract was ambiguous in 
any way. Importantly, DPW has not appealed from the District Court's decision barring its 
claims, nor from any other decision or order. Therefore, it is conclusively established that 
DPW filed and pursued its claims and offsets against the Contractors despite the fact that the 
Contract clearly and unambiguously barred DPW from doing so. Or in other words, DPW 
filed and pursued its claims and offsets (for five years) against the Contractors "without a 
reasonable basis in fact or law." No amount of rehashing the arguments and affidavits 
submitted during the five-year litigation can change those simple, unchallenged conclusions. 
4 The District Court specifically concluded that "[ n]o party will be pennitted to present evidence to the jury 
of contract clauses and witnesses' interpretations of those contractual provisions. Interpretation of this clear and 
unambiguous contract is a question of law and not in the province of the jury." (R. Vol. IV, p. 740) (See a/so, R. 
Vol. II, p. 258; R. Vol. IV, p. 628, 735). 
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DPW knew from the very initiation of this lawsuit that it failed to provide the 
Contractors with either notice ofthe alleged defects or any opportunity to repair them prior 
to filing its claims against them. DPW admitted numerous times that it failed to provide such 
notice and opportunity to the Contractors. (See, R. Vol., IV, pp. 625 (District Court citing 
to Deposition of DPW employee, Jan Frew); Tr., Sept. 29, 2008, p. 20, L. 8-9.) As the 
drafter ofthe Contract, DPW certainly knew that written notice and an opportunity to repair 
were required, yet it ignored the plain requirements of its contract and actively defended its 
wrongful pursuit of those claims and offsets for five years. 
Rather than address the issue head-on in response to this appeal, DPW attempts to 
obfuscate the real issues before the Court and distract the Court from the simple fact that it 
failed to comply with the clear requirements of a contract that it drafted. Much of DPW' s 
briefing consists of reasserting its allegations -which were both unproven and strenuously 
disputed- that the Contractors' work was defective. None of those alleged facts, even if 
presumed to be true, have any bearing on the question whether DPW filed and pursued its 
counterclaims, and asserted offsets against the Contractors' claims, without first complying 
with the prerequisites of the Contract. 
DPW attempted to convince the District Court that it could be absolved of its failure 
to provide written notice and an opportunity to repair if it could show that the Contractors 
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had actual notice of the alleged defects and if the Contractors were not prejudiced by the lack 
of written notice. SE/Z disagrees that such could be a sufficient substitute of the clear 
requirements of the Contract. Moreover, DPW's argument addresses only the notice 
requirement, and wholly fails to address the complete lack of any opportunity to repair. 
Nevertheless, DPW initially convinced the District Court to find an issue of fact regarding 
actual notice and allow it to proceed to trial on that theory.s Ultimately, however, DPW was 
unable to produce any evidence of a lack of prejudice, or any evidence of an opportunity to 
repair. The District Court, upon realizing that there was no basis for a conclusion that the 
Contractors were not prejudiced by the lack of notice and an opportunity to repair, entered 
its order barring DPW's claims. In its decision, the Court explained that "it would be 
5 The District Court's finding was based in part upon the Affidavit of Albert Munio, which was submitted 
to this Court in DPW's Motion to Augment. As mentioned above, Mr. Munio's testimony and credentials were 
discredited, and DPW even sought leave of the court to replace him with a new expert shortly before trial. A copy of 
DPW's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Name Paul Fu as an Expert is submitted to this Court with SE/Z's 
Second Motion to Augment the Record. A copy ofSE/Z's Motion to Strike Portions of the Affidavit of Albert F. 
Munio, together with the supporting memorandum and Affidavit of Frederick 1. Hahn, III, are also submitted with 
the Second Motion to Augment the Record. The exhibits attached to Mr. Hahn's affidavit establish, among other 
things, that Mr. Munio never received an engineering degree, contrary to his assertions made in the very same 
affidavit that DPW has now submitted to this Court in its Motion to Augment. The District Court commented at the 
hearing on the Motion to Strike: 
I think all the parties are aware that the state may end up having a bit of a 
problem with the expert's credentials .... But I thought under the 
circumstances that to prevent unfair prejudice to the other, to the opposing 
parties, I would simply tell DPW they were going to be stuck with that witness 
even though apparently some warts have been exposed that might cut against his 
credibility. 
(Tr., Sept. 29, 2008, p. II, L. 9-21.) It is quite puzzling that DPW would continue to rely upon the opinions of Mr. 
Munio on Appeal after he was so discredited and they sought to replace him as their witness before trial. 
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impossible to reconcile any possible finding of a lack of prejudice to the contractors 
with the prosecution of the cross-claim by the State to recover damages .... " (R. Vol. 
IV, p. 626 (emphases added).) Importantly, as stated above, the District Court's 
conclusions are not appealed by DPW. 
The Court reaffinned its decision to bar DPW's claims against the Contractors on 
reconsideration, and barred DPW from raising allegations at trial that the Contractors 
deliberately hid non-compliant work, which DPW hoped would be sufficient to absolve it of 
its failure to provide notice and an opportunity to repair. (R. Vol. IV, p. 739.) The Court 
called such allegations "highly speculative" and opined that it would "lead to confusion of 
the issues and waste time." (R. Vol. IV, p. 739.) In its conclusions on reconsideration, the 
Court wrote: 
Finally, the State will not be pennitted to present any evidence 
that work that is not directly related to the Contractors' claims 
for tennination for convenience damages was not done 
according to the plans and specifications. This is consistent 
with the Court's recent ruling that the State's cross claims and 
offsets are barred by the failure to provide notice and an 
opportunity to cure. 
(R. Vol. IV, p. 741) (emphasis added). Again, DPW has not appealed from the decision of 
the District Court, but it continues in its attempt to create "confusion of the issues" and 
"waste time" on irrelevant allegations of unproven facts and speculative arguments. 
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Because the Contract was clear and unambiguous, the process DPW needed to follow 
to pursue a claim and assert offsets against the Contractors was not subject to any other 
reasonable interpretation. See Potlach Ed. Ass 'n v. Potlach School Dist. No. 285, 148 Idaho 
630,633,226 P.3d 1277,1280 (2010) ("A contract term is ambiguous when there are two 
different reasonable interpretations or the language is nonsensical."). Therefore, DPW "acted 
without any reasonable basis in fact or law" when it filed its claims against the Contractors 
and actively pursued those claims throughout several years of litigation without first having 
provided the Contractors with proper notice and an opportunity to repair. 
C. SE/Z Joins in the Ar&uments Submitted by Co-Appellant Hobson Re&ardin& 
Matters of First Impression. 
SE/Z joins Co-Appellant Hobson's Reply Brief submitted III this Appeal, and 
specifically joins in the arguments set forth in Section II(F) (pages 19-24). An award of 
attorneys fees is not precluded in this case on the basis that the appeal raises an issue of first 
impression, as argued by DPW. As explained in Hobson's briefing and in SE/Z's opening 
brief, this Court has awarded fees on mUltiple occasions where a party acted contrary to the 
clear and unambiguous requirements of statutes, ordinances or contracts which had not 
previously been construed by the Court. Where a contract is unambiguous, as the District 
Court here found, there is no need for the contract to have been previously construed by this 
Court because the contract is not subject to more than one reasonable interpretation. Potlach 
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Ed. Ass'n, 148 Idaho at 633,226 P.3d at 1280. The clear and unambiguous language of the 
Contract says what it says, and it means what it says. 
D. The District Court Failed to Carry Out the Purposes of Idaho Code § 12-117. 
SE/Z also joins in the arguments set forth in Section II(B) (pages 7-10) of Co-
Appellant Hobson's brief. The District Court failed to carry out the purposes ofIdaho Code 
§ 12-117 when it failed to consider the application of the statute and award fees and costs to 
the Contractors. Shortly after its adoption, this Court explained the dual purposes of section 
12-117: 
We believe the purpose of that statute is two-fold: (1) to serve 
as a deterrent to groundless or arbitrary agency action; and (2) 
to provide a remedy for persons who have borne unfair and 
unjustified financial burdens defending against groundless 
charges or attempting to correct mistakes agencies should never 
had made. 
Bogner v. State Dept. of Revenue and Taxation, 107 Idaho 854, 859, 693 P.2d 1056, 1061 
(1984); accord Fischer, 141 Idaho 356, 109 P.3d at 1098 (citing Bogner). Here the District 
Court held that the Contractors prevailed in part, yet failed to conduct any analysis under 
section 12-117(1) or (2). As demonstrated above, the District Court should have found the 
Contractors to be the overall prevailing parties, and should have awarded the Contractors 
theirreasonable attorney fees and costs, because ofDPW' s unreasonable pursuit of its claims 
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and offsets against the Contractors. At a minimum, the Contractors should have been 
awarded fees as the partially-prevailing parties for defeating DPW's claims and offsets. 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
SE/Z respectfully submits that DPW's re-argument of substantive issues that were 
before the District Court in its attempt to show a "reasonable basis in law or fact" and avoid 
an adverse award of costs and attorneys fees is misplaced. The interlocutory orders of the 
District Court are not before this Court. Moreover, if they were, DPW's reliance on the 
augmented record, including testimony and evidence from its perjured "expert witness" 
Albert Munio, demonstrates DPW's lack of a reasonable basis in law or fact. The District 
Court's determination that DPW's claims and offsets were barred under the parties' Contract 
is conclusive. 
SE/Z respectfully submits this Court should apply the plain language of Idaho Code 
§ 12-117 to the District Court's determination that DPW' s claims and offsets were barred and 
the ultimate resolution ofthe Contractors' claims, in order to reach the purpose of that statute 
as identified in Bogner v. State Dept. Of Revenue and Taxation, State Tax Commission, 107 
Idaho at 859, 693 P.2d at 1061 . The Court should reverse the Trial Court's denial of the 
Contractors' application for an award of costs and attorneys fees and remand back to the 
District Court for an award pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-117(1), or in the alternative under 
14 
section 12-117(2), under the analysis in Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating & 
Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 117 P.3d l30 (2005). Finally, SE/Z respectfully submits that 
the Court should award the Contractors attorneys fees and costs on appeal, pursuant to Idaho 
Code § 12-117. 
!,.f 
DATED this 21 "day of November, 2011. 
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE & 
BAILEY, CHARTERED 
By:_-f-''--______ +-____ _ 
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DATED this :;tlday of November, 201 
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ON THE 
BIOSAFETY LEVEL 3 LAB 
DPW PROJECT NO. 02353 
BOISE, IDAHO 
GENERAL CONTRACTOR: 
SE/Z CONSTRUCTION, LLC 
5471 S. Heyrend Drive 
Idaho Falls,Idaho 
Steve Zambarano 
WGK FILE S521A 
September 1, 2005 
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DPW ProJ.ct No. 02353, Bia SafelY ,-, 
SE/Z R.qUOlI for EquiI.bl. Adjuilmcnl 
WGK file SS21A - OlSEPOS 
DAMAGES SUMMARY 
Items Cost (thru' 30JUN05) 
SE/Z Claim Amount $ 302941.70 
Lea EJectric1 Inc. Claim Ampunt $22,760.00 
Hobson Claim Amount $1,390,043.85 
SUS-TOTAL $1,715,745.55 
15% mark-up $257,361.83 
CLAIM TOTAL .. $1,973,107.38 
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DPW PtOj~t No. 0235:1. Blo Safety L~ <s\ 
SElZRequestforE'qul!abl. AdjUjtmeJt J.;Y 
WGK m. S5:!lA - olsmos 
SE/Z DAMAGES 
Items Cost ..... (thru" 3PJUN05) 
H. O. Overhead Expenses 
(07JUL04 - 03JUN05) $25,547.40 
Actual Field Overhead Expenses 
(01MAY04 - 31JUL04) Base Contract # 149 .. 100) $19,249.24 
Actual Field Overhead Expenses 
(01AUG04 - 31DEC04) Base Contract # 149-100) $35,587.11 
. Actual.Field Overhead Expenses . . 
(01JAN05 - 30JUN05) (Base Contract # 149-100) $37515.00 
Delay Costs 
(Sub job Contract # 149-200) $466.48 
Termination for Convenience t (Subjob Contract # 149-TFC) $9964.70 
-. 
Professional Consultant Fees $62,927.77 
. 
Legal Fees (thru' 31AUG05) $6,462.00 
Work not Paid by the Owner $ 105,222.00 
SE/Z Claim Amount $ 302,941.70 
SEIZ has agreed to provide to the State of Idaho, Division of Public Warks, aCCess to 
additional documents upon receipt of a "specific document request relevant .to the Bio-Safety 
'Laboratory Project, DPW 02-353~' in writing to SEIZ Construction. SEIZ retains the right for 
refusal of specific documents they deem llf!.warranted in the support of their Equitable 
AdJt1stment Request. 
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